Foley's Thesis, Negishi's Method, Existence Proofs and Computation by K. Vela Velupillai
 
 




Department of Economics 
University of Trento 
Via Inama 5 
381 22 Trento Italy 
 
 
Discussion Paper Series 
 
 




Foley’s thesis, Negishi's Method, 









                                                           
 This refers, of course, to Duncan Foley's remarkably original and brilliant -- and unfortunately little 
acknowledged  -- Yale doctoral dissertation of 1967 (Foley, 1967). In the by now vast orthodox 
literature on computable general equilibrium theory, and its applied off shoots, I have not been able to 
detect a single reference to what I may call Foley's Method (ibid, pp. 64-73), which could provide -- 
as legitimately as Negishi's Method -- an alternative to the orthodox approach to `computing' 
Walrasian (Arrow-Debreu) equilibrium prices, using, for example, variants of Scarf's Method, (Scarf, 
1973). Abstract
Duncan Foley￿ s many-faceted and outstanding contributions to macroeco-
nomics, microeconomics, general equilibrium theory, the theory of taxation,
history of economic thought, the magni￿cent dynamics of classical economics,
classical value theory, Bayesian statistics, formal dynamics and, most recently,
fascinating forays into an interpretation of economic evolution from a variety of
complexity theoretic viewpoints have all left ￿and continue to leave ￿signi￿cant
marks in the development and structure of economic theory. He belongs to the
grand tradition of visionaries who theorise with imaginative audacity on the dy-
namics, evolution and contradictions of capitalist economies ￿a tradition that,
perhaps, begins with Marx and Mill, continues with Keynes and Schumpeter,
reaching new heights with the iconoclastic brilliancies of a Tsuru and a Good-
win, a Chakravarty and a Nelson, and to which Duncan Foley adds a lustre of
much value.
In this contribution I return to mathematical themes broached in Foley￿ s
brilliant and pioneering Yale doctoral dissertation (Foley, 1967) and attempt to
view them as a Computable Economist1 would.The intention is to suggest that
algorithmic indeterminacies are intrinsic to the foundations of economic theory
in the mathematical mode.
JEL Codes: C02, C63, D58, E17
Keywords: Equilibrium existence theorems, Welfare theorems, Constructive
proofs, Computability.
1I coined the description computable economics at the end of the 1980s to characterise
the formalization of economic theory and its various closures in terms of the mathematics of
computability theory and constructive analysis. More recently I have to adopt the slightly
more general description algorithmic economic theory (cf. Velupillai, 2011).
21 Introduction
"Consider a two-agent, two-good exchange economy with given ini-
tial allocation of goods over the agents.
a). Explain Negishi￿ s strategy for proving the existence of a Wal-
rasian equilibrium. Illustrate his procedure in an Edgeworth box
diagram."
Duncan Foley￿ s Advanced Microeconomics Examination in Class,
New School University, May 10, 2005, 2nd Question; italics added
In an interview held on November 30, 2001, at his apartment in New York
City, reported in Colander, et.al., (2004), Foley, in answering the Interviewers￿
speci￿c question to ￿ tell [them] about [his] thesis￿ , made the interesting and
important observation that:
"My thesis adapted the methods of general equilibrium theory
to the problem of public goods. .. It has some results that I still
think are neat. I proposed an analog of competitive equilibrium for
public goods .... and proved that it was Pareto e¢ cient...... . [T]he
method was exactly the same as Koopmans￿ s proof [in Koopmans
(1957)] of the Pareto e¢ ciency of price equilibria. .... In proving
this theorem I independently discovered Negishi￿ s method for proving
the existence of Walrasian competitive equilibrium, which is based
on moving along the Pareto e¢ cient surface by changing household
weights in a social welfare function rather than using a T￿tonnement
argument on prices."
Foley, 2004, p. 186; italics added.
I have known Duncan Foley, personally, for over a decade and have, in that
period, communicated with him intensively (via the ubiquitous possibility pro-
vided by the e-mail) on many topics - both professional and personal, with a
clear dominance of the former. No subject occurred with more frequency or in-
tensity than the problems posed by considerations of computability of Walrasian
equilibria in their Arrow-Debreu versions and their existence proofs underpinned
by non-constructive methods. In the ten years - or so - we have exchanged cor-
respondence on these issues - and the couple of times we were able to meet
personally and talk about them - it was clear that there was some ￿ conver-
gence￿towards mutually agreed (and agreeable) positions had been achieved,
albeit commencing from vastly di⁄erent starting positions. I believe Foley came
around to understand my conviction - based on absolutely rigorous and com-
pletely documented (in the form of fairly respectable mathematical publications,
cf., for example, Velupillai (2006) and Velupillai (2009)) - on the uncomputabil-
ity of Arrow-Debreu equilibria and also the appeal made, in almost all orthodox
mathematical economics when generating existence proofs, to non-constructive
methods of proof.
3For example in an e-mail to me as recently as 11 October, 2010, with its sub-
ject denoted by ￿ Computability of Walrasian Equilibrium￿ , Foley wrote (italics
added):
I take your position to be that Walrasian equilibrium is uncomputable
in the price simplex due to the non-constructivity of the Bolzano-
Weierstrass theorem, a conclusion with which I agree2.
In an earlier correspondence, on 26 January 2010, this time with the subject
of the contents referred to as: Constructibility of exchange equilibrium, Foley
wrote (again, italics added):
"I take your point that conventional ("ordinary") economic theory
operates uncritically in the domain of real analysis, and that if the
problem of exchange equilibrium [that is, a point in or near the
contract set] is posed in this fashion ￿nding a point in the exchange
equilibrium (Pareto set) is non-constructive. "
To this e-mail, Foley appended an earlier interchange between us on related
issues, where he had written me (italics added):
"My conjecture is that there is a constructive algorithmic (and
even economic) method to ￿nd exchange equilibrium (not necessarily
Walrasian equilibrium) allocations by allowing agents to ￿nd and
make mutually advantageous trades. I￿ m not sure you and I ever
reached a meeting of minds on this question, but I￿ d like to pursue
it further."
My response to this important conjecture was (italics in the original):
"Unfortunately, I am unable to agree with your ￿ conjecture￿ . To
￿ ￿nd [an] exchange equilibrium￿ , with a ￿ constructive algorithmic
method￿(by the way, if ￿ constructive￿then ￿ algorithmic￿!), means
you must ￿rst de￿ne the domain and range of the agents￿decision
space ￿ constructively￿ . Once you do this, the whole problem of an
algorithm becomes trivial. ￿ Allowing agents to make mutually ad-
vantageous trades￿ , means - in algorithmic mathematics - that these
￿ trades￿are in terms of constructive or computable numbers, which
they are not in any kind of ordinary economic theory."
It has only gradually dawned on me that Foley has always had in mind ￿
or, perhaps, only in the deep recesses of his fertile mind ￿￿ Negishi￿ s method
for proving the existence of Walrasian competitive equilibrium￿ , which he had
2My ￿ position￿is more ￿ radical￿ , as could be discerned from the results reported in Velupillai
(2006, 2009). The uncomputability of Walrasian equilibria is not only due to the intrinsic
undecidable disjunctions in the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, but also due to the methods of
proof used in the Brouwer (or Kakutani) ￿xed point theorem - and other constructive and
computability issues, all of which are discussed in the above two cited papers.
4￿ independently discovered￿over thirty ￿ve years ago, and for which discovery the
orthodox mathematical economists have never given him adequate - indeed, any
- credit. Not even usually sympathetic doctrine historians, specialising in the
development of mathematical economics, have - to the best of my knowledge
- acknowledged Foley￿ s pioneering contribution, from this point of view, in his
remarkably original thesis. From my personal point of view, it is a matter of
lasting regret that the thesis was never published as a book, that could have
been used as a text in any serious graduate course in mathematical economics
in which refreshing economics was coupled to innovative mathematics. Above
all. it could have provied a broader social and political scienti￿c basis for one
strand of computable general equilibrium theory.
In this paper I take up the thread, with which I have been weaving a tale,
on computability and constructivity in mathematical and computational eco-
nomics, mostly via ￿ conversations￿with Duncan Foley in e-mail interchanges,
and try to make explicit my standpoint on Negishi￿ s Method. This is the sub-
ject matter of section 3, below, preceded by a section 2 where I outline my
more professional indebtedness - one that is common to my own generation of
theoretically-minded, mathematically literate and (I hope!) socially and polit-
ically enlightened economists - to the vast and fascinating canvasses on which
Duncan Foley has been fashioning a vision of economics that is far richer than
any kind orthodoxy has been able to devise. The concluding section is a re￿ ec-
tion on the lessons that one might be able to extract for a kind of economic
theory that is formalised in terms of an empirically useful mathematics.
2 A Personal Preamble
"If the society as a whole has the complexity level of a general-
purpose computer [or Turing Machine], it will be impossible for any
other general-purpose computer to work out its evolution except by
direct simulation. To carry out the program of rational explana-
tion of behavior in this context would require positing that each
individual agent in society had some way of simulating the poten-
tial evolution of a system of interlinked Turing machines. At this
point the rational explanation program runs into deep paradoxes of
self-reference."
Foley, 1998, p. 40
This pithy characterisation of the conundrums of the ￿ rational explanation
[research] program￿in economics is typical of the way Duncan Foley has been
able to locate one or another of the lacunae in orthodox economic theory,
whether mathematically underpinned or not. Essentially, Foley has invoked
the celebrated Halting Problem for Turing Machines to point out where the
￿ rational explanation of behavior￿must fall foul of formal possibilities of evolu-
tionary predictability. As a matter of fact, it is not even necessary ￿for this
failure to manifest itself ￿to posit ￿ that each individual agent ... had some way
5of simulating the potential evolution of interlinked Turing machines￿ ; it is su¢ -
cient to posit that ￿ society as a whole has the complexity of [one single Turing
machine]￿ . Moreover, even if the ￿ individual agent had some way of simulating
the potential evolution of [one single] Turing machine￿ , it will not be possible to
circumvent the consequences of the Halting problem for Turing Machines.
I was a graduate student of economics at the University of Lund in the very
early 70s. At that time in Lund the writings of the great past economic pioneers
of that University were still being assigned to graduate students almost routinely
(in the original languages: Swedish, Norwegian and German). Even standard
graduate courses in Macroeconomics, Growth Theory and Capital Theory had,
in their required reading lists, texts by Wicksell and Lindahl, Lundberg and
Ohlin and Palander and Landgren. So, it was not surprising that the graduate
course in Public Finance was heavily in￿ uenced by the Swedish tradition in
Public Finance and Taxation ￿i.e., the tradition emanating from the doctoral
dissertations of Wicksell and Lindhal (but also in￿ uenced by Leif Johansen￿ s
contemporary work at Oslo). We were genuinely fortunate graduate students
at Lund.
Thus, already in the early 70s, I was introduced to Duncan Foley￿ s pioneer-
ing work on ￿ Lindahl prices￿ . Both his doctoral dissertation (as published in
Yale Economic Essays, Foley, 1967) and his Econometrica paper of 1970 (Fo-
ley, 1970) were part of the required reading, together with parts of Wicksell￿ s
Finanzthoretische Untersuchungen3 (Wicksell, 1896) and more substan-
tial parts of Lindahl￿ s Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteurung4 (Lindahl, 1919).
Foley was placed in the grand tradition of Swedish Public Finance, as he was
entitled to.
However, two important caveats should be added to this legitimate claim to
a Swedish lineage for Foley￿ s early work on public ￿nance in the general equi-
librium tradition. Firstly, the internal debate in Sweden, particularly between
Myrdal (1930) and Lindahl (1959) somehow did not get re￿ ected in the details
of Foley￿ s thesis, nor in his later Marxist oriented stance on public ￿nance. I
state this only because Myrdal￿ s sustained critique of the Wicksell-Lindahl tra-
dition in public ￿nance (ibid, particularly chapter 7), would, I am sure, have
been handsomely endorsed by the later Foley (1978)5.
Secondly, Foley￿ s lifelong work on macroeconomic theory has not re￿ ected
the possible link one can discern between the public ￿nance of the Swedes ￿
3My copy of this book once belonged to ￿sten Unden, Sweden￿ s acting Prime Minister in
the transition regime between Per Albin Hansson￿ s death and the eventually long tenure of
Tage Erlander. Unden served also as the Social Democrats￿Foreign Minister for a long period
under Erlander, but also for a brief period in the mid-1920s. My copy of this Wicksellian
classic is dated ￿ Mars 1907￿by Unden, i.e., when he was still only 20 years old!
4I am in the happy and privileged position of owning the author￿ s presentation copy to
Wicksell￿ s personal friend, Gustaf Ste⁄en!
5My ￿rst encounter with this line of research by Foley was in late 1977, during my tenure
as a Research Fellow at C.O.R.E in Louvain-La-Neuve, during the academic year 1977/78. In
the autumn of 1977 I obtained, quite accidentally, a copy of Foley￿ s draft paper on Marxist
Theories of the Fiscal Process, prepared for an International Seminar in Public Economics,
at Namur, in Belgium, in November, 1976. I still own an almost tattered copy of the paper
(Foley, 1976)!
6particularly in how it determined a very special vision of national income ac-
counting and balance-sheet constructions, as stressed by Hicks in his beautiful
Lindahl Festschrift contribution (Hicks, 1956) ￿and the macroeconomic dynam-
ics they developed, largely prior to and independently of Keynes of the General
Theory. I have tried, over the years, to stress this connection, as a way of
suggesting a foundation for macroeconomics in the Swedish tradition in public
￿nance (Velupillai, 1991).
In any case, being a graduate student at Lund was my path towards an
introduction to Duncan Foley￿ s pioneering work. Since then, from time to time,
my own visions have been broadened and deepened by Duncan Foley￿ s sustained
original contributions, in a wide and interesting variety of ways, to various
frontiers in economic theory, latterly mostly in macroeconomics, a ￿eld that has
always remained central in my research agenda and teaching activities.
By the time I went to Cambridge in 1973 and my own interest in Macroeco-
nomics was being fostered by the great Cambridge pioneers of that ￿eld (partic-
ularly Nicky Kaldor and Richard Goodwin, my PhD supervisors at Cambridge),
the Foley-Sidrauski book (Foley & Sidrauski, 1971) had also become standard
reading for us. Growth theory, capital theory and distribution theory were the
exciting topics being discussed at Cambridge at that time and once again I had
a Foley work assigned as required reading (the Foley-Sidrauski book).
I teach advanced macroeconomics at the Graduate level in Trento. Last year
I began using the ￿nely crafted Foley-Michl book on Growth and Distribution
(Foley & Michl, 1999) as the main supplementary textbook for this course, where
growth theory is emphasized6. The Foley-Michl book is refreshingly modern but
is so by showing and grounding the evolution of modern theories of growth in
the works of our great classical masters.
I mention it this way to show a remarkable consistency in the way Foley￿ s
masterly contributions to economic theory proceeds ￿ at least in the way I
have learned from his writings. They are always grounded in the works of our
classical and neoclassical pioneers. Unlike much modern work, where it is either
a Whig interpretation or, worse, ahistorical stories, Foley￿ s work reminds us
that we stand on the shoulders of giants, mostly past masters but often also
contemporaries7.
These aspects are beautifully developed and evident in his ￿ Schumpeter Lec-
tures￿(Foley, 2003). His mastery of the classical economists for their broad
insights, for their magnanimity and, above all, for their visions of what Bau-
mol called ￿ magni￿cent dynamics￿ , is unsurpassed in modern economic schol-
arship, especially ￿but not only ￿because of Foley￿ s remarkable mastery of a
wide variety of mathematical techniques, in addition to a deep understanding
6The main assigned textbook was Lance Taylor￿ s Reconstructing Macroeconomics (Taylor,
2004), one of the most refreshingly original alternatives to the orthodoxies of the Newclassicals
and the New Keynesians.
7Lindahl was not long dead when Foley￿ s work on Lindahl prices ￿rst appeared; I should
like to add that when I myself went to Cambridge for my PhD and was interviewed by Nicky
Kaldor his only question to me was: ￿ Why do you want to come here when you have Lindahl
in Sweden?" ￿this in 1973 and Lindahl had been dead just over ten years! His spirit, as those
of the other contemporary and past Swedes, was very much alive in Cambridge at that time.
7of mathematical philosophy.
Mentioning Baumol in the above paragraph recalls to my mind the way I
￿nally resolved a perplexity regarding Foley￿ s intellectual work. I had wondered
why his work on Lindahl prices did not continue and how the macroeconomic
work got done, almost in a parallel fashion and they both, then, led to his politi-
cal economy outlook on public expenditure, on the one hand, and, on the other,
how the monetary-￿scal framework of the work with Sidrauski ￿still relevant at
some frontiers of macroeconomic theory ￿moved on to issues of growth, distri-
bution and capital theories, often in the Cambridge (UK) tradition. By chance,
my interest in the theory of public ￿nance was reignited in the late 80s and I had
occasion to read Baumol￿ s book of that period on Superfairness (Baumol,1986).
There, on p.72, I read as follows:
￿All of [the work on fairness theory] appears to have its roots
in Foley￿ s writings. .... Foley reports that he was led to think
of the [fairness] criterion after seeing a movie in which Bob Dylan
graphically emphasized the importance of fairness issues.￿
I think I understood then how there was a uni￿ed thread in Foley￿ s work in
Public Finance in the framework of general equilibrium theory, Macrodynamics,
History of Economic Thought and the evolution of capitalist institutions: it was
a passionate concern for fairness in all its dimensions and rami￿cations. This is
also why I think Duncan is such a ￿ne and knowledgeable all-round economist,
with a wonderful mastery of so many aspects of economic theory. Again, his
mathematical competence makes it easy for him to master many frontiers of
economic theory and keep abreast of developments.
My own work in the last two decades or so has been in that exciting inter-
face between dynamical systems theory and computability and computational
complexity theory. In addition to this I have also been concentrating on the
relevance of constructive mathematics for formalizing economic theory ￿partic-
ularly microeconomics and economic dynamics. There are few economists I￿ d
rather talk to, converse with, have my works read, for critical comments, than
Duncan Foley8.
Duncan Foley￿ s long Introduction to the collected essays of Peter Albin (Fo-
ley, 1998), is a masterly piece, linking dynamics and computability theory, via
the formalism of Formal Languages Theory. It contains one of the most ped-
agogical expositions of the Chomsky Hierarchy for economists. I have never
failed, in the last decade or so, to have it in my various reading lists for almost
any course of lectures I give. In that Introduction ￿but not only in that one
￿Duncan￿ s expository skills, backed by vast and deep mathematical knowledge
and competence, underpinned by a thorough understanding of economic theory,
comes to surface in a most felicitous way.
Foley has, in recent years, been focusing on interpreting economic phenom-
ena from the point of view of varieties of complexity theories. He has also begun
to wonder about thermodynamic interpretations of economic processes. They
8With the obvious exception of my friend and colleague, Stefano Zambelli.
8are not new issues to his fertile mind; but they seem to be taking a new turn,
underpinned by new visions. I expect these new directions will bear fruit in the
same way his thoughts have led to innovative works, right from the beginning,
with those classics on classics: Lindahl prices, motivated by issues of fairness.
Thus, it must be the case that fairness is one motif in the humane tapestry
Duncan Foley has made available to many of us, when we consider ourselves
economists in the humanistic mode. Perhaps I am also on the right track
when I believe his recent work and interest in nonlinear dynamics and com-
plexity are motivated by his incessant search for the ￿rst principles of what
Karl Polanyi felicitously called The Great Transformation ￿the transformation
that was brought about by Industrialization to the advanced economic societies.
Somehow, despite these many faceted interests and contributions, and the
central motif of fairness, I have always felt that mathematical rigour and compu-
tation have played an important part in the way Foley has theorised, even when
no explicit formulas, equations or other mathematical hieroglyphics appear in
his imaginative writings. In my own decade-long ￿ conversations; with Duncan
Foley these two aspects have been the dominant themes. Perhaps that is why
the subject matter of this contribution, to pay homage to Foley, is underpinned
by the conundrums of proof and computation.
3 Negishi￿ s Method, Fundamental Theorems of
Welfare Economics, Equilibrium Existence Proofs
and Computation
"In proving the existence theorem I independently discovered
Negishi￿ s method for proving the existence of Walrasian competi-
tive equilibrium, which is based on moving along the Pareto e¢ cient
surface by changing household weights in a social welfare function
rather than using a t￿tonnement argument on prices."
Foley, 2004, p. 186; italics added.
Negishi himself, re￿ ecting on his youthful masterpiece9 more than three
decades later (Negishi, 1994, p. xiv; italics added), remarked:
"The method of proof used in this essay [i.e., in Negishi (1960)] has
been found useful also for such problems as equilibrium in in￿nite
9Foley was not quite 30 years old when ￿ proving the existence theorem￿and Negishi still only
27. In both cases their respective contributions were among the ￿rst few formal publications
in two outstanding academic careers, each pathbreaking in its own way. These facts alone
place in perspective Clower￿ s mature re￿ection (Clower, 1984, pp. 263/4):
￿Economics is less obviously a young man￿ s game than mathematics, but I doubt
that many economists have had a really new idea after the age of thirty-￿ve. I
must confess that, one way or another, everything I have done in the second half
of my life reminds me (at least retrospectively) of something I did or thought
about earlier.￿
9dimensional space and computation of equilibria."
What exactly was Negishi￿ s method of proof and how did it contribute to
the computation of equilibria?
Duncan Foley￿ s pithy characterisation of the di⁄erence between the stan-
dard approach to proving the existence of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, and its
computation, by a t￿tonnement procedure ￿i.e., algorithm ￿of a mapping from
the price simplex to itself, and the alternative Negishi method of iterating the
weights assigned to individual utility functions that go into the de￿nition of a
social welfare function which is maximised to determine ￿i.e., compute ￿the
equilibrium, captures the key innovative aspect of the latter approach. Essen-
tially, therefore, the di⁄erence between the standard approach to the proof of
existence of equilibrium Arrow-Debreu prices, and their computation, and the
Negishi approach boils down to the following:
￿ The standard approach proves the existence of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
prices by an appeal to a ￿xed point theorem and computes them ￿the
equilibrium prices ￿by invoking the Uzawa equivalence theorem (Uzawa,
1962) and devising an algorithm for the excess demand functions that map
a price simplex into itself to determine the ￿xed point (Scarf, 1973).
￿ The Negishi approach proves, given initial endowments, the existence of
individual welfare weights de￿ning a social welfare function, whose maxi-
mization (subject to the usual constraints) determines the identical Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium. The standard mapping of excess demand functions,
mapping a price simplex into itself to determine a ￿xed point, is replaced
by a mapping from the space of utility weights into itself, appealing to the
same kind of ￿xed point theorem (in this case, the Kakutani ￿xed point
theorem) to prove the existence of equilibrium prices.
￿ In other words, the method of proof of existence of equilibrium prices in
the one approach is replaced by the proof of existence of ￿ equilibrium util-
ity weights￿ , both appealing to traditional ￿xed point theorems (Brouwer,
1910, von Neumann 1937 (1945-6), and Kakutani, 194110).
￿ In both cases, the computation of equilibrium prices on the one hand
and, on the other, the computation of equilibrium weights, algorithms are
devised that are claimed to determine (even if only approximately) the
same ￿xed points.
Before proceeding any further, I should add that I am in the happy position
of being able to refer the interested reader to a scholarly survey of Negishi￿ s
work. Takashi Negishi￿ s outstanding ￿ contributions to economic analysis￿are
brilliantly and comprehensively surveyed by Warren Young in his recent paper
10There is a curious ￿albeit inessential ￿￿ typo￿in Negishi￿ s reference to Kakutani￿ s classic
as having been published in 1948. The ￿ typo￿is not ￿ corrected￿even in the reprinted version
of negishi (1960) in Negishi (1994).
10(Young, 2008). Young￿ s paper provides a particularly appropriate background
￿together with at least a nodding acquaintance of § II & § III of Foley￿ s Thesis
(Foley, 1967, pp.64-76) ￿to the issues I tackle in this section. It ￿Young￿ s
paper ￿ is especially relevant also because his elegant summary of Negishi￿ s
￿ contribution to economic analysis￿identi￿es Negishi (1960) as one of the two
crucial pillars11 on which to tell a coherent and persuasive story of what he calls
the Negishi ￿ research program￿(ibid, p. 162; second set of italics, added)12:
"To sum up, a number of major research programs can be iden-
ti￿ed, therefore, as emanating from Negishi￿ s now classic papers,
that of (1960) [Negishi, 1960] and 1961 [Negishi, 1961], respectively.
Negishi￿ s 1960 paper forms the basis for both ￿ theoretical￿and ￿ ap-
plied￿research programs in general equilibrium analysis, and his 1961
paper ... has been almost as in￿uential in demarcating ongoing re-
search up to the present in the ￿eld of imperfect competition and
non-tatonnement processes. These papers ... attest to Negishi￿ s con-
siderable in￿ uence on the development of modern economic theory
and analysis."
However, no one ￿ to the best of my knowledge ￿ has studied Negishi￿ s
method of proof from the point of view of constructivity and computability,
the issues that were at the centre of my dialogue with Duncan Foley. Young￿ s
perceptive - and, in my opinion, entirely correct - identi￿cation of the crucial role
played by Negishi (1960) in ￿ both "theoretical" and "applied" research program
in general equilibrium analysis￿is, in fact, about methods of existence proofs
and computable general equilibrium (CGE), and its o⁄shoots, in the form of
applied computable general equilibrium analysis ACGE) ￿even leading up to
current frontiers in computational issues in DSGE models (cf., Judd, 2005, pp.
52-57, for example).
Before I turn to these issues of the constructivity and computability of
Negishi￿ s method of existence proofs and the underpinning of some aspects
computation in CGE and ACGE models in Negishi￿ s approach (rather than,
for example, in the standard approach pioneered by Scarf, 1973), there is one
important economic theoretic confusion that needs to be sorted out. This is
the question of the role played by the fundamental theorems of welfare eco-
nomics in Negishi￿ s method of the proof of the existence of a general (walrasian)
equilibrium.
It is generally agreed ￿and especially by Foley ￿that the Negishi method of
existence proof is an applications of ￿xed point theorems on the utility simplex,
in contrast to the ￿ standard￿way of applying such theorems to the price simplex
(cf., Cheng, 1991, p. 138, and above). This fact has generated a remarkable
11The other one being Negishi (1961). I am in full agreement with Young important obser-
vation that it is Negishi (1960) that is more important, which is why I have added italics to
the phrase ￿ almost as in￿uential￿ , in the above quote.
12Even young￿ s comprehensive list of references - 108, in all, in an article that distills the
essence of the Negishi ￿ reserach program￿in only 12 papges, manages to forget to refer to
Foley (1967).
11confusion on the question of which fundamental theorem of welfare economics
underpins the Negishi method! For a method that has been around for over
half a century, it is somewhat disheartening to note that frontier research and
researchers seem still to be confused on which of the two fundamental theorem
of welfare economics is relevant in Negishi￿ s method. Thus, we ￿nd Judd, as
recently as only a few years ago (op.cit, pp. 52-3) claiming, unreservedly, that
(italics added):
"The Negishi method exploits the ￿rst theorem of welfare economics,
which states that any competitive equilibrium of an Arrow-Debreu
model is Pareto e¢ cient."
On the other hand, Warren Young (op.cit, p.152; italics added) equally
con￿dentially stating that:
In his pioneering 1960 paper, Negishi provided a completely new
way of proving the existence of equilibrium, via the Second Welfare
Theorem. He established equivalence between the equilibrium prob-
lem set out by Arrow-Debreu and what has been called ￿ mathemati-
cal programming￿ , thereby developing a ￿ method￿that has been used
with much success by later economists working in both theoretical
and applied general equilibrium modelling ... ."
Fortunately, Negishi himself returned to a discussion of the ￿ Negishi method,
or Negishi approach￿more recently (Negishi, 2008, p. 168) and may have helped
sort out this conundrum (ibid, p. 167; italics added):
"The so-called Negishi method, or Negishi approach, has often
been used in studies of dynamic in￿nite-dimensional general equilib-
rium theory, and the numerical computation of such equilibria ... .
This method is an application of the Negishi theorem (Negishi 1960),
which demonstrates the existence of a general equilibrium using the
￿rst theorem of welfare economics, which states that any competitive
equilibrium of an Arrow-Debreu model is Pareto e¢ cient. In other
words, a general equilibrium of a competitive economy is considered
as the maximization of a kind of social welfare function (i.e., the
properly weighted sum of individual utilities, where the weights are
inversely proportional to the marginal utility of income."
Negishi is one of those rare economists who is both a scholar of the history
of economic theory and one of the most competent general equilibrium theorists
and ￿even if he had not been the originator of the Negishi method ￿therefore
one may feel forced to reject Warren Young￿ s claim13!
13The puzzle here is that the Young and Negishi articles appear ￿ back-to-back￿ , in the same
issue of the International Journal of Economic Theory and the two distingusihed authors
thank each other handsomely in their respective acknowledgements!
12As a matter of fact, from my Computable Economics ￿i.e., from a construc-
tivist and recursion theoretic - point of view, this conundrum is a non-problem
for several reasons. First of all, both fundamental theorems of welfare economics
are proved non-constructively and lead to uncomputable equilibria. Secondly,
all ￿to the best of my knowledge ￿of the current algorithms utilised in CGE,
ACGE and DSGE modelling appeal to undecidable disjunctions and are ef-
fectively meaningless from a computablity point of view. Thirdly, and most
importantly, Negishi￿ s theorem14 is, itself, proved nonconstructively. Finally, at
the risk of challenging the mature re￿ ections of one of the great and masterly
contributors to general equilibrium theory, I would like to point out that there
is no meaning that can be attached to Negishi￿ s method if applied to ￿ dynamic
in￿nite-dimensional general equilibrium theory￿￿even if such a thing can be
de￿ned (or, indeed, has been de￿ned, except in the utterly ￿ctional and non-
rigorous world of newclassical claims of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
modelling ￿i.e., so called DSGE modelling).
There are two theorems in Negishi (1960). I shall concentrate on Theorem 2
(ibid, p.5), which (I think) is the more important one and the one that came to
play the important role justly attributed to it via the Negishi Research Program
outlined by Young (op.cit)15.
Proposition 1 The Proof of the Existence of Maximising Welfare Weights in
the Negishi Theorem is Nonconstructive
Proof. (Sketch) Negishi￿ s proof relies on satisfying the Slater (Complementary)
Slackness Conditions (Slater, 195016). Slater￿ s proof17 of these conditions invoke
the Kakutani ￿xed point theorem (Theorem 1 in Kakuani, 1941), and Kakutani￿ s
Min-Max Theorem (Theorem 3, ibid). These two theorems, in turn, invoke
Theorem 2 and the Corollary (ibid, p.458), which are based on Theorem 1 (ibid,
p. 457). This latter theorem is itself based on the validity of the Brouwer ￿xed
point theorem, which is not just nonconstructive, but also non-constructi￿able
(cf., Brouwer, 1952).
Proposition 2 The vector of maximising welfare weights, derived in the Negishi
Theorem, is uncomputable
14Negishi￿ s theorem is one thing; Negishi￿ s method is quite a di⁄erent thing. The latter
should refer to the ￿ method of proof￿ , but the vast literature on the issue ￿admirably docu-
mented in Young (2008) ￿is not fee of confusion on this point. Essentially, the ￿ method￿refers
to the fact that a mapping is de￿ned, not on the price simplex, but on the ￿ utility simplex￿
(as mentioned above with a reference to Cheng, 1991).
15To demonstrate the nonconstructive elements of Theorem 1 (ibid, p.5), I would need to
include almost a tutorial on constructive mathematics to make clear the notion of compactness
that is legitimate in constructive analysis. For reasons of ￿ readability￿and ￿ deeper￿reasons of
aesthetics and mathematical philosophy, I shall refer to my two main results as￿ Claims￿and
their plausible validity as ￿ Remarks￿ , and not as ￿ Theorems￿and ￿ proofs￿ , respectively.
16Slater (1950) must easily qualify for inclusion in the class of pioneering articles that
remained forever in the ￿ samizdat￿ status of a Discussion Paper!
17I should add that the applied general equilibrium theorists who use Negishi￿ s method to
￿ compute￿(uncomputable) equilibria do not seem to be fully aware of the implications of some
of the key assumptions in Slater￿ s complementary slackness conditions. That Negishi (1960)
is aware of them is clear from his Assumption 2 and Lemma 1.
13Proof. A straightforward implication of Claim 1
Discovering the exact nature and source of appeals to nonconstructive modes
of reasoning, appeals to undecidable disjunctions and reliance on nonconstruc-
tive mathematical entities in the formulation of a theorem is a tortuous exercise.
The nature of the pervasive presence of these three elements ￿i.e., nonconstruc-
tive modes of reasoning, primarily the reliance on tertium non datur, undecid-
able disjunctions and nonconstructive mathematical entities ￿in any standard
theorem and its proof, and the di¢ culties of discovering them, is elegantly out-
lined by Fred Richman (1990, p. 125; italics added):
￿Even those who like algorithms have remarkably little appreci-
ation of the thoroughgoing algorithmic thinking that is required for
a constructive proof. This is illustrated by the nonconstructive na-
ture of many proofs in books on numerical analysis, the theoretical
study of practical numerical algorithms. I would guess that most
realist mathematicians are unable even to recognize when a proof is
constructive in the intuitionist￿ s sense.
It is a lot harder than one might think to recognize when a the-
orem depends on a nonconstructive argument. One reason is that
proofs are rarely self-contained, but depend on other theorems whose
proofs depend on still other theorems. These other theorems have of-
ten been internalized to such an extent that we are not aware whether
or not nonconstructive arguments have been used, or must be used,
in their proofs. Another reason is that the law of excluded middle
[LEM] is so ingrained in our thinking that we do not distinguish
between di⁄erent formulations of a theorem that are trivially equiv-
alent given LEM, although one formulation may have a constructive
proof and the other not.￿
Finally, it is easy to demonstrate that Foley￿ s theorems in section III of
his pioneering thesis (Foley, 1967) are proved nonconstructively. For example,
this is straightforward in the case of the Theorem in paragraph 3.29 (see 72,
where Brouwer￿ s ￿xed point theorem is invoked). It is less straightforward to
demonstrate the upper-semicontinuity of the mapping on the simplex K (pp.
69-70). The theorem of paragraph 3.22 is, on the other hand, easily shown to
be nonconstructive due its appeal to the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem (p. 69).
Similar considerations apply to the theorems of section II (but there separating
hyperplane theorems are invoked, rather than ￿xed point theorems ￿but the
former are no more constructive or e⁄ective than the latter, unless de￿ned on
very specially structured normed spaces).
These are further reasons to pay close attention to Richman￿ s carefully
spelled out constructive thoughts. For, a supreme economic theorist like Dun-
can Foley, who also happens to be mathematically able, could use words like
￿ construct￿(for example, bottom p. 60) in an otherwise wholly nonconstruc-
tive setting and not suspect that ￿ proofs are rarely self-contained, but depend
on other theorems whose proofs depend on still other theorems. These other
14theorems have often been internalized to such an extent that we are not aware
whether or not constructive arguments have been used, or must be used, in their
proofs.￿
In any case, Foley￿ s candid ￿ confession￿ , in his interview of November, 2001
(Foley, 2004), quoted in the opening lines of this paper, should have made all this
obvious. This is because he acknowledges that the method he used ￿ was exactly
the same as Koopmans￿ s proof [in Koopmans (1957)] of the Pareto e¢ ciency
of price equilibria￿ . This, I believe is a reference to the pedagogically excellent,
although mathematically deceptively simple, exposition in chapter 2 of Koop-
mans (1957). The methods used by Koopmans, a combination of ￿xed point
theorems and separating and supporting hyperplane theorems, are intrinsically
nonconstructive and uncomputable. Moreover, the whole method adopted by
Koopmans in this beautiful exposition rules out Diophantine considerations ￿
to which I now turn, in conclusion.
4 Diophantine Conclusions
"I have argued here as forcibly as I can that it is a serious error
to indict mathematical thinking or the use of mathematics per se as
the source of these [speci￿c] ￿ aws [in macroeconomics and ￿nance].
What economics needs is not more or less mathematics and statis-
tics, but mathematics and statistics better adapted to its problems
and its limitations. In the long run the discipline of economics will
be shaped as much by its sociology and the philosophy of science and
scienti￿c interchange that commands its consensus as by particular
methods or theoretical approaches."
Foley, 2010, p. 16; italics added.
As always, Foley￿ s thoughts on formalisation in economics are both per-
ceptive and prescient. To understand the intrinsic problems and limitations
of economics, without ￿rst transmogrifying them into a stunted mathematical
formalism, is the art of good theorising. The great classical economists, some
of the later neoclassicals, almost all the Austrians ￿ even including Schum-
peter among them ￿did not need any mathematical formalism at all to theorise
imaginatively and derive momentous policy conclusions. Surely, this is true of
Keynes, the immediate post-Wicksellian Swedes ￿I have in mind, in particu-
lar, Lindahl, Myrdal, Hammarskj￿ld and Lundberg ￿and the ￿rst generation
Chicago economists, too. That a master mathematical economist expresses such
an enlightened, almost visionary attitude to the place of mathematics in eco-
nomics should be taken seriously by the modern economic theorist with his or
her penchant for mathematising everything in sight indiscriminately.
I ￿nd this particular vision that Foley enunciates intellectually most con-
genial and fully coherent with my own research program in economics. I have
argued for over twenty years that the kind of mathematics we should use should
be dictated by, and adapted to, the ￿ problems and limitations￿of the natural do-
main of economic data, the nature and constraints of economic decision making
15and the social and political constraints on them that make the search for deter-
mined and determinate solutions to constructively provable intractable problems
a vain and chimerical pursuit.
However, like Foley, I do not associate such a vision with any less need for
mathematics ￿but a need for a di⁄erent kind of mathematics and, in my case,
I have tried to make a sustained case for what may now be called Diophantine
Economics. Mathematical formalisms of economic entities ￿data structures,
institutions, behaviour, etc., ￿ must respect the Diophantine nature of their
domains of de￿nition. This constraint, when respected, leads to the natural
algorithmic indeterminacies of Diophantine decision problems18. Constructive
and computable mathematics are a natural framework within which to frame
Diophantine problems. The constructive and computable indeterminacies dis-
cussed in the previous section are elements in the research program on Diophan-
tine Economics I am trying to develop (cf., Velupillai, 2011).
In this connection I may ask the following question. Lindahl￿ s Thesis is a
book of a little over 200 pages. It has exactly two diagrams (on p. 89 & on
p. 159). The only mathematical symbolism in the book is con￿ned to the con-
tents of exactly one footnote (ppp. 90-920). How, then, can we assume that
Lindahl￿ s intense and deep economic theoretical reasoning, backed by impecca-
ble doctrine-historical scholarship and wide empirical knowledge of the public
￿nances and taxation, underpinned by ethical arguments and constitutional con-
straints imposed by one kind of democratic arrangement, can be formalised by
one kind of mathematics? It is here that I think Foley￿ s wise precept to seek
out ￿ mathematics and statistics better adapted to [the problems of economics]
and its limitations￿becomes highly relevant.
The dichotomy between proof and computation that is characteristic of or-
thodox mathematical economics has led to the many unwarranted claims and
propositions of applied general equilibrium theory ￿not to mention policies un-
derpinned by the fundamental theorems of welfare economics. Mathematical
economics of almost any variety is intrinsically non-algorithmic and, a fortiori,
non-Diophantine. One unfortunate reason for this is the enforced dichotomy be-
tween proof and computation. Orthodox mathematical economics is seriously
de￿cient in the epistemology of computation and the philosophy of mathematics,
also partly due to this unnatural dichotomy.
In Diophantine Economics there is no such dichotomy.
Mathematical political science and social choice theory did not consider the
Arrow Impossibility Theorem a shackle on mathematical theorising. There is
no need for the economic theorist to consider the natural indeterminacies, un-
decidabilities and uncomputabilites of Diophantine decision problems any less
18In diophantine economics orthodox optimization paradigms are replaced by the more
general framework of diophantine decision problems, where emphasis is placed on problem
solving, ￿nding methods to solve problems and classifying the algorithmic di¢ culties of such
methods. It is squarely within what I have come to call Classical Behavioural Economics, that
which was pioneered by Herbert Simon, underpinned by a model of computation (in Simon￿ s
case, even if mostly implicitly, it is the Turing Model of Computation). Some of the formal
de￿nitions of the above concepts can be found in Velupillai (2009A, 2010).
16constraining on mathematical theorising in economics.
One of the most stunted use of the notion of a social equilibrium is the one
by that doyen of mathematical economics, Debreu (1952). I have rarely seen a
better, more enlightened, more imaginative use of the phrase social equilibrium
than the one by the young Foley, in his extraordinary doctoral dissertation￿ s
concluding pages (Foley, 1967, pp.92-3; italics added):
"The study of societies at the present time is a study of social
equilibrium. This important concept can be de￿ned only vaguely,
as a state where the interaction of the millions of individuals in
a society produces certain relatively constant aggregate features. ...
Economic and political equilibria are special aspects of general social
equilibrium, which includes the relative constancy of religion, law,
family, and all the features of existence without which we could not
recognize social life at all."
As economists struggle to encapsulate moral and ethical constraints in their
formulation of behavioural and institutional hypotheses, mediated and humbled
by the vicissitudes of history and its contours, the kind of social equilibrium
Foley, with characteristic imagination, conceived almost half a century ago,
becomes relevant almost with a vengeance.
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